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Sept. 15, UHiO.]

.T. C. P~JNNf<}Y COM.PANY (a Corporatioll), Pt't.itiunt'r, v.
SUPERLOR COlTR1' Oli' :t<'H,ESNO COUNTY, Re'spondent; IRENE JOHNSON et al., Real Parties in Interest.
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. [1] Mandamus-To Courts: Prohibition-Application of RulesDismissal.-Either a writ of mandate to compel dismissal or
a writ of prohibition to prevent trial of an action is an appropriate remedy after the five-year period prescribed by Code
Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to trial, has expired.
[2] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations .
Extending Time.-To serve as an extension of the five-year i
period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an
action to trial, a stipulation must be written and extend in
express terms the time of trial to a date beyond the five-year
period or expressly waive the right to dismissal. Stipulations
that "merely extend the time for trial within the five-year
period, absent a showing that the parties intended otherwise,
will not extend the period.
[3] Id.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations Extending Timc.-Stipulations extending the five-year period under
Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to trial are no
different from other contracts and are subject to the same
rules of construction.
[4] Trial-Pretrial Procedure.-With certain minor exceptions
(Rules for Superior Courts, rules 9, 9.5), the pretrial conference
is an essential part of the trial procedure in a civil case in
which a memorandum to set is filed (rule 8). Counsel are required to complete their depositions and otber discovery proceedings before the pretrial conference (rule 8.2, as amended) ;
the efficient functioning of the pretrial procedure drpends on
such preparation by counsel.
[5] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Stipulations
Extending Time.-Though a pretrial conference must precede
the trial, a valid stipulation extending the time of pretrial
conference does not necessarily extend the- five·year period
prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583, for bringing an action to
trial.
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Dismissal, Discontinuance and Nonsuit, § 39.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 16 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 11.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, \:\ 51; I'rcJi.ibitiulI, :;:m;
[2, 3, 5, 6] HisIJli:3sal, ~ 68; [4, 8] 'frial, § 6.1; [7] 'fl'ial, § 67; [9]
Dismissal, § 62.5; [10] Dismissal, §§ 66, 67; [11] Dismissal, § 66.
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[6] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Tl'ial-Stipulations Extending Time.-The filing of :111 amended complaint or the deciding
of preliminary motions or demurrers may be necessary prerequisites to a trial, and a stipulation postponing the time for
doing either would necessarily extend the time for trial, but
such a stipulation would not extend the time for trial beyond
the five-year period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., § 583,
absent a showing that the parties so intended.
[7] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Computation of Statutory Period.-Code Civ. Proc., § 583, does not contemplate that
the time consumed in such ordinary proceedings as serving
process, disposing of demurrers, amending pleadings, waitinl~
for a place on the court's calendar or securing the attendanee
of a jury are to be excluded from computation of the five-yea!'
period for bringing an action to trial.
[8] Trial-Pretriai Procedure.-A pretrial conference is merely a
step, though a vital one, leading to the trial.
[9] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Effect of Pretrial Rules.-The pretrial rules do not affect the operation of
Code Civ. Proc., § 583, relating to dismissal of nctions not
brought to trial within five years. They repeatedly distinguish
pretrial conference and the trial and thus make clear that, in
adopting a pretrial procedure, the Judicial Council did not
regard an action as brought to trial by the holding of a pretrial conference.
[10] ld.-Delay in Bringing ActioD to Trial-Duty to DismissExceptioDs to Rme.-Despite the "apparently mandatory language" of Code Civ. Proc., § 583, requiring dismissal of actions
not brought to trial within five years after being filed, it is
subject to certain implied exceptions. Thus, the time during
which, for all practical purposes, going to trial would be impossible, whether because of total lack of jurisdiction in the
strict sense or because proceeding to trial would be both impracticable and futile, must be excluded in computing the ftveyear period.
[11] ld.-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Duty to DismissExceptions to Rule.-An insufficient stipulation lUay be material evidence on the issue whether it was ..impossible, impractieable or a futile gesture to bring the action to trial
within the five-year period prescribed by Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 583, but even had it been impossible for plaintiffs to go to
trial during the till1e covered by the stipulation, that ill1possibility would be of no !lvail to thPlI1 where nl·ithec part.v
was prepared for the pretrial conCer('IlI'e (Rules for Superior
Courts, rule 8.2, as amended), and whl're nearly two mouths
n'lIlaiul'u nfter discovel'Y pl'oceedings Wl're completed ill which
plnil1titTf' could h:lve !'let the case for 1\ pretrial cllllferell""
wililill tIll' fh·,··yt'ar period.
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Fresno County from proceeding with the trial of an
action. Writ granted.
Stammer, McKnight & Barnum and Dean A. Bailey for
Petitioner.
Robert M. Wash, County Counsel, and Floyd R. Viau,
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
James K. Kubota and Mikio Uchiyama for Real Parties in
Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to
prevent respondent superior court from proceeding in an
action on the ground that it must be dismissed under section
583 of the Code of Civil Procedure for plaintiffs' failure to
bring it to trial within five years.
Plaintiffs filed the action on December 31, 1953, but did
not serve the first amended complaint and summons on petitioner until December 31, 1956. Petitioner filed its answer
on January 21,1957. On December 5, 1957, nearly four years
after the action was begun, plaintiffs filed a memorandum
to set the case for trial. Respondent court set the pretrial
conference for March 21, 1958, and the trial for May 15,
1958. Before the time set for the pretrial conference had arrived, petitioner and plaintiffs agreed to the following stipulation:
"Stipulation and Order Continuing Pre-Trial Conference."
"It is hereby stipulated, by and between the parties hereto,
that the pre-trial conference in the above entitled action.
heretofore set for March 21, 1958, may be continued to be
re-set upon motion of either party in order to permit the
parties to complete the taking of depositions and discovery
procedures. "
"Dated: March 12, 1958."
Counsel for both parties signed the stipulation and filed
it on March 12, 1958. Both parties contirlUp.d- to take depositions and avail themselves of oHler discovery procedures
until October 1958. Plaintiffs made no attempt to set the
,('ase for pretrial ('ollference or for trial between October ]958,
the end of the period contemplated by the stipulation, and
December 31, 1958, the cnd of the five-year period allowed
by section 583. Plaintiffs spent this time attempting to join
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another defendant. On January 8, 1959, petitioner moved to
dismiss the action under section 583. Respondent court denied
the motion and set the pretrial conference for February 10,
1959, and the trial for March 2-4, 1959. The parties had submitted a joint pretrial statement and the court had filed
a pretrial conference order when petitioner filed its petition
for a writ of prohibition on February 24, 1959.
[1] Either a writ of mandate to compel dismissal or a
writ of prohibition to prevent the trial of the action is an
appropriate remedy after the time prescribed by section 583
has expired. (Andersen v. Superior Cottrt, 187 Cal. 95, 97-100
[200 P. 963] ; Tomales Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court, 35
Cal.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968]; 3 Witkin, California Procedure 2569.)
The relevant part of section 583 provides:
•• Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be
dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been
commenced . . . unless such action is brought to trial within
five years after the plaintiff has filed his action, except where
the parties have filed a stipulation in writing that the time
may be extended. . . ."
[2] Plaintiffs contend that the stipulation signed by both
parties on March 12, 1958, extended the five-year period
prescribed by this section. To serve as such an extension the
stipulation must be written and extend in express terms the
time of trial to a date beyond the five-year period or expressly waive the right to a dismissal. (Miller & MU;, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 333, 338 [219 P. 1006].) Stipulations that merely extend the time for trial within the fiveyear period, absent a showing that the parties intended otherwise, will not extend the five-year period. (Larkin v. Superior
Court, 171 Cal. 719, 723 [154 P. 841, Ann.Cas. 1917D 670] ;
City of Los Angeles v. S1tperior Court, 185 Cal. 405, 412
[197 P. 79] ; Rio Vista Min. Co. v. Superior C01trt, 187 Cal.
1, 3 [200 P. 616].) [3] Stipulations under section 583, however, are no different from other contracts (Smith v. Bear
Valley etc. Co., 26 Cal.2d 590, 601 [160 P.2d 1]), and are
subject to the same rules of construction (Woley v. Turk1ts,
51 Cal.2d 402, 407 [334 P.2d 12]).
Plaintiffs do not dispute the foregoing rules. Instead, they
contend that the cases cited must be reappraised in the light
of the pretrial rules adopted by the Judicial Council for
the Superior Courts (see 47 Cal.2d 3-9, as amended, 50 Ca1.2d
71-73), and that the stipulation entered into for the express
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purpose of extending the pretrial confer£'ncc necessarily extended the time for trial beyond the five-year period. [4] It
is true that, with certain minor exceptions (rules 9 and 9.5),
the pretrial conference is now an essential part of the trial
. procedure in "every civil case in which a memorandum to
. set is filed" (rule 8). It is also true that the rules require
counsel to complete their depositions and other discovery proceedings before the pretrial conference (rule 8.2, as amended,
50 Ca1.2d 71). Indeed, the efficient functioning of the pretrial procedure depends upon such preparation by counsel.
(See Oantillon v. Superior Oourt, 150 Cal.App.2d 184, 187
[309 P.2d 890]; Kincaid, P"e-T"ial Oomes to Oalifornia,
30 State Bar J. 414, 417; Kincaid, Pre-Trial Oonference Procedure in Oaliform'a, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 379.) [5] Even
though the pretrial conference must precede the trial, it does
not follow that a valid stipulation extending the time of pretrial conference necessarily extends the time prescribed by
section 583.
[6] The filing of an amended complaint or the deciding
of preliminary motions or demurrers may also be necessary
prerequisites to the trial, and. a stipulation postponing the
time for doing either would necessarily enend the time for
trial. It has never been held, however, that such a stipUlation
extends the time for trial beyond the five-year period, absent
a showing that the parties so intended. [7] On the contrary,
it has been held that ". . . even though a part of the fiveyear period must necessarily be consumed in service of prOCCSf!,
disposition of demurrers, amendment of pleadings, if necessary, usual and reasonable time consumed in waiting for a
place on the court's calendar or in securing the attendance
of a jury and suchlike usual and necessary proceedings; . . .
the section does not contemplate that time consumed in such
ordinary proceedings are to be excluded from a computation
of the five-year period." (Oontinental Pacific Lines v. Superior Oourt, 142 Cal.App.2d 744, 750 [299 P.2d 417].)
[8] Plaintiffs apparently assume that the pretrial conferclIce marks the beginning of the trial in contending that
,. pre-trial procedure . . . is an integral part of the trial of
the case." A pretrial conference, however, is merely a step,
even though a vital one, leading to the trial. [9] The pretrial rules do not affect the operation of section 583. Thpy
repeatedly distinguish pretrial eonfel'ence and the trial al\(l
thus make clear that in adopting t11e pretrial llt'ocedure the
Judicial Council did not regard an action as brought to trial
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by the holding of a pretrial conference. 1 Despite the addition
of another step in the necessary proceedings leading to the
trial, the case must still be "brought to trial within five years
after the plaintiff has filed his action. . . ." Moreover, the
stipulation herein did not extend the pretrial conference
beyond the five·year period. It was filed on :March 12, 1958more than nine months before the expiration of that period.
A case more appropriate for plaintiffs' argument would be
presented had the stipulation expressly set the date of the
pretrial conference after the five-year period. Even if such
a stipulation automatically extended the five-year period
(cf. Fisher v. Superior COl£rt, 157 Cal.App.2d 126, 131 [320
P.2d 894], expressly leaving the question open), we have no
such stipulation here.
[10] Despite its" apparently maudatory language" (Wyoming Padfic Oil Co. v. Presion, 50 Ca1.2d 736, 740 [329
P.2d 489]) section 583 is subject to certain implied exceptions
(Rose v. Knapp, 38 Ca1.2d 114, 117 [237 P.2d 981] and cases
cited). Thus, the time during which "for all practical purposes, going to trial would be impossible, whether this was
because of total lack of jurisdiction in the strict sense, or
because proceeding to trial would be both impracticable and
futile" (Chrisfin v. Superior Oourt, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 533 [71
P.2d 205, 112· A.L.R. 1153]) must be cxclud('d in computing
the five-year period. (See Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Sllperior Court, 28 Ca1.2d 61, 64 [168 P.2d 665] : City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 916 [207 P.2d 17J;
Rose v. Knapp, sttpra, at 117; Wyoming Pacific Oil 00. v.
Preston, supra, at 740-741; Woley v. Tttrk1ls, 51 Ca1.2d 402,
406-407 [334 P.2d 12] ; see also Vccki v. Sorensen, 171 Cal.
App.2d 390, 395 [340 P.2d 1020].) [11] Although plaintiffs
do not explicitly raise the question whetht"r their ease comes
within this exception, ,,·c havc examined that possibility since
"an insufficient stipUlation may be material evidence upon the
'Thus, the rules provide that a case requiring a pretrial conference
sball be assigned a time for the conference preceding the time of the
trial (rule 8.1) : tbat the parties need not disclose tbeir witnesses nt the
conference (rule 8.3); and that the pretrial confer"nee judge shall 8t't
the time and pJare of trial (rulell 8.4 anti S.l!!). The rules governing
the comlud of the confer"nl'e (8.3), the scope of t.he pretrial ('onference
order (8.6) ana the effect of thnt order UpOIl the subsequent course of
tbe case (8.8) demonstrnte that the conference does not mnrk the be·
ginning of the trilll. (See also, MWer 4· Lllz. Inc. v. Superior Clmrt,
192 Cal. 333, 342 [219 P. 1006]; City of Los A7Igeles v. Superior Court,
I" Cal.2d Hi, 19·22 f98 P.2d 207]; lleier v. Supf'rior Court, 55 Cal.App.
2d 675, G7G [131 P.2d j;"jol].)
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issue whether it wa.<; impossiblE', impracticable or a futile
gesture to bring the action to trial" (Woley v. Turkus, supra,
at 408). Even had it becn impossible for plaintiffs to go
to trial during the time covered by the stipulation, since
neither party was prepared for the pretrial conference (see
rule 8.2, supra), that impossibility would be of no avail to
plaintiffs. Nearly two months remained after the discovery
proceedings were completed in which plaintiffs could have
set the case for a pretrial conferenc and a trial within the
five-year period. It is true that plaintiffs spent this time seeking to join a second defendant, but nothing prevented their
proceeding to pretrial conference and trial against this petitioner while they were seeking to join another party.
Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J.,
Peters, J., and White, J. concurred.

